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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-PATENT
LAW-THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S QUESTIONABLE
OPINION IN IPXL HOLDINGS, L.L.C. v.
AMAZON.COM, INC. CREATES MORE
QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS REGARDING
HYBRID CLAIMS
Bradley Birchfield*
N its recent decision in IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded
that a claim in a patent owned by plaintiff IPXL Holdings ("IPXL")
was invalid due to being indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 1121 and therefore
not infringed by defendant Amazon.com ("Amazon"). 2 In an issue of
first impression, the Federal Circuit concluded that the claim was invalid
because it contained both a system and a method for using that system.3
According to the court, this type of claim, also referred to as a "hybrid"
claim, was not sufficient to apprise a person of ordinary skill in the art of
its scope, and thus failed to meet the statutory requirements for validity.4
While the ultimate decision of the Federal Circuit regarding the hybrid
claim was correct, the reasoning and the sparse legal authority upon
which it relied to reach its decision offers little guidance for future patent
cases involving similar hybrid claims. The Federal Circuit has opened the
door for the invalidation of countless existing patents containing similar
hybrid claims because of its questionable opinion in this case.
IPXL is the owner of United States Patent No. 6,149,055 ("the '055
patent").5 This patent, entitled "Electronic Fund Transfer or Transaction
System," is directed toward electronic systems such as automated teller
* J.D. Candidate 2008, SMU Dedman School of Law.
1. The second paragraph of this section of the patent code is the relevant paragraph
for this case. It reads: "The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particu-
larly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as
his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
2. IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 430 F.3d 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1378.
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systems or point-of-sale systems that facilitate financial transactions.6
The '055 patent essentially provides a system that allows users to quickly
and easily execute financial transactions by storing, predicting, and
presenting information to the user on a single screen in an efficient man-
ner.7 Claim 25 of the '055 patent, the hybrid claim at issue in this case,
reads: "The system of claim 2 wherein the predicted transaction informa-
tion comprises both a transaction type and transaction parameters associ-
ated with that transaction type, and the user uses the input means to
either change the predicted transaction information or accept the dis-
played transaction type and transaction parameters." 8 IPXL boasts that
the system patented by the '055 patent offers numerous advantages over
prior systems, including increased flexibility, ease of use, and the ability
to quickly complete a transaction on a single user screen. 9
Amazon is the owner and operator of a popular and well-known In-
ternet retail website at www.amazon.com.10 Amazon sells a large variety
of retail items through its website, such as books, music, and consumer
electronics."1 Amazon offers its patented "l-Click" feature to facilitate
easy ordering through its website.' 2 This feature allows users who have
previously entered personal information on Amazon's website, such as a
credit card number, to quickly and easily place an online order without
having to enter the information again.1 3 Amazon stores the information
previously entered by the user, thereby allowing an order to be easily
placed with only a single click of the mouse button.14 The order is auto-
matically entered into Amazon's system after this one click, and will be
finalized after a ninety-minute waiting period during which the user can
cancel or modify the order.' 5
IPXL sued Amazon on January 22, 2004, alleging that Amazon's "1-
Click" feature infringed claim 25 and several other claims of its '055 pat-
ent.1 6 On June 23, 2004, both IPXL and Amazon moved for summary
judgment. 17 Amazon moved for summary judgment on the ground that
the '055 patent was invalid and not infringed, and IPXL moved for sum-
mary judgment that the '055 patent was non-obvious.' 8 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted sum-
mary judgment for Amazon, holding inter alia that Amazon's "l-Click"
6. Id. at 1378-79.
7. Id. at 1379; IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 2d 513, 516
(E. D. Va. 2004).
8. IPXL, 430 F.3d at 1384.
9. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. at 5-6, IPXL, 430 F.3d 1377
(No. 05-1009).
10. IPXL, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
11. Id.; see http://www.amazon.com.
12. IPXL, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
13. Id.
14. IPXL, 430 F.3d at 1379.
15. Id.





feature did not infringe IPXL's '055 patent and that all of the claims at
issue in the patent were invalid. 19 IPXL appealed the case to the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which also held the claims invalid and
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Amazon. 20
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court and held claim 25 of
the '055 patent to be invalid since it was indefinite under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112.21 The primary reason the court cited for finding the claim indefi-
nite was that the claim was ambiguous due to its content and was not
sufficiently precise to apprise a competitor of its scope.22 Because the
claim recited both a system and a method for using that system, the Fed-
eral Circuit found that it would be unclear when infringement of the
claim would actually occur.23
The Federal Circuit relied primarily on a decision of the Board of Pat-
ent Appeals and Interferences of the Patent and Trade Office ("PTO"),
Ex parte Lyell, in reaching its decision.24 In Lyell, the court found that
reciting "both an apparatus and a method of using that apparatus renders
a claim indefinite under section 112, paragraph 2."25 The hybrid claim at
issue in Lyell was similar to claim 25 of this case, also claiming both an
apparatus and a method for using that apparatus. 26 The claim in Lyell
reads: "[a]n automatic transmission tool in the form of a workstand and
method for using same comprising... "27 The Lyell court found that al-
though certain hybrid claims are permissible in the United States, the
claim at issue was properly rejected because it violated 35 U.S.C. § 101 by
overlapping two statutory classes of invention. 28
In addition to Lyell, the Federal Circuit also relied upon the PTO's
Manual of Patent Examination Procedure ("MPEP") and a patent law
treatise to support its assertion that claims containing both an apparatus
and a method of using the apparatus are ambiguous and should be re-
jected under 35 U.S.C. § 112.29 The cited MPEP section states that "[a]
single claim which claims both an apparatus and the method steps of us-
ing the apparatus is indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph. '30
The patent law treatise cited by the court likewise cautions to "[n]ever
mix claim types to different classes of invention in a single claim. '31
19. IPXL, 430 F.3d at 1378.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1383-84.
22. Id. at 1384.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.; Ex parte Lyell, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1548, 1549 (Bd. Pat. App & Interf. 1990).
26. Lyell, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1549.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1552.
29. IPXL, 430 F.3d at 1384.
30. U.S. PATENT & TRADE OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURES § 2173.05(p)(II) (Rev. ed. 2006).




Applying the standards taught in Lyell, the MPEP, and the treatise to
claim 25 in this case, the Federal Circuit needed surprisingly little analysis
to conclude that the claim was exactly the same as the claim in Lyell-a
claim containing both a system and a method for using that system.32 The
court, in an apparently easy decision, delivered its analysis and applica-
tion of the law to claim 25 in only two sentences:
Thus, it is unclear whether infringement of claim 25 occurs when one
creates a system that allows the user to change the predicted transac-
tion information or accept the displayed transaction, or whether in-
fringement occurs when the user actually uses the input means to
change transaction information or uses the input means to accept a
displayed transaction. Because claim 25 recites both a system and
the method for using that system, it does not apprise a person of
ordinary skill in the art of its scope, and it is invalid under section
112, paragraph 2.33
Because this was an issue of first impression in the Federal Circuit, one
would expect that the court would have performed a more thorough anal-
ysis of the hybrid claim at issue. By basing its decision on only law gath-
ered from one case, the MPEP, and a patent treatise, the court
overlooked other possible interpretations of the hybrid claim and failed
to provide adequate guidance for future hybrid claim cases.
First, by providing such little analysis of claim 25 of the '055 patent, the
Federal Circuit failed to give sufficient guidance to exactly what was
wrong with the hybrid claim. The crux of the court's decision was that the
claim was not specific enough to give notice to competitors of its scope
and thus was indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112.34 Competitors, in other
words, would not know whether they infringed the claim by making a
similar system, or by using the system in a similar manner as described in
the claim. Unfortunately that was the extent of the court's analysis of the
claim. Other than pointing out that the claim contained both a system
and method for using that system, the court discussed nothing else spe-
cific about the language used in the claim. The court, for example, indi-
cated that the phrase in the claim "the user uses the input means" was the
offending method language in the hybrid claim. 35 But the court did not
discuss the possibility that this phrase could be something other than a
method claim.
One such possibility the court should have considered is that the lan-
guage constitutes a functional limitation. A functional limitation is "an
attempt to define something by what it does, rather than by what it is"36




36. Collegenet, Inc. v. XAP Corp., 442 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1062-63 (D. Or. 2006); U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 30, § 2173.05(g).
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and by itself does not render a claim improper.37 It appears that this
language of the claim could be construed as a functional limitation since
it is describing how IPXL's claimed system actually works. Indeed, this is
what IPXL argued in its brief.38 But since the court did not specifically
address this language of the hybrid claim, we are left to guess what they
were thinking. Was it a method claim, and not a functional limitation
since the phrase "the user uses" indicates an actual person performing the
act, as some courts have assumed,39 or are all words of action considered
method claims regardless of who or what is performing the action? By
not adequately addressing the specific language of the claim, the court
left the door open for countless challenges to all existing patents contain-
ing hybrid claims regardless of language, and left us with the burning
question: Are all hybrid claims invalid, or just the ones where a person is
performing an action?
When the court declared it would be unclear when infringement of
claim 25 would occur due to its inclusion of both a system and a method
claim, it failed to discuss the implications of a well-known rule for patent
infringement known as the "all-elements" rule.40 The court stated that it
would be unclear if a competitor infringed the claim by creating a similar
device of claim 25 or by simply using a similar device.41 The all-elements
rule of claim infringement might have helped the court to answer this
question. This rule states that in order for a court to find infringement,
each and every element of the claim at issue in the plaintiff's patent must
be present in the defendant's device.42 This rule has been in use by the
Federal Circuit since 1985 when the court declared that "each element of
a claim is material and essential, and that in order for a court to find
infringement, the plaintiff must show the presence of every element or its
substantial equivalent in the accused device. ' 43 The Supreme Court also
approved this rule in 1997 when it stated that "[e]ach element contained
in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the patented
invention . . . ."44 This rule furthermore applies equally to method or
process claims. The Federal Circuit court has stated that
[i]nfringement of process inventions is subject to the "all-elements
rule" whereby each of the claimed steps of a patented process must
be performed in an infringing process, literally or by an equivalent of
37. Collegenet, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1062-63; Toshiba Corp. v. Juniper Networks, Inc.,
No. Civ. 03-1035-SLR, 2006 WL 1788479, *4 (D. Del., 2006); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, supra note 30, § 2173.05(g).
38. Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellant IPXL Holdings, L.L.C., supra note 9, at 50-51.
39. See Collegenet, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1062.
40. Collaboration Prop., Inc. v. Tandberg ASA, No. C 05-01940 MPH, 2006 WL
1752140, at *7 n.3 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2006).
41. IPXL, 430 F.3d at 1384.
42. See 5A-18DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.03[4][a] (2006).
43. Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Inpro II
Licensing, S.A.R.L. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 450 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("To es-
tablish infringement, every element and limitation of the claim must be present in the
accused device, literally or by an equivalent.").
44. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).
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that step, with due attention to the role of each step in the context of
the patented invention. 45
Therefore, the court's simple declaration that claim 25 of the '055 patent
was invalid due to the inability to distinguish how it could be infringed is
questionable at best. By simply applying the all-elements rule for in-
fringement, the court could have concluded that a competitor would be
required to possess a similar system as well as to use that system in a
similar manner in order for infringement to be found. Applied to this
case, IPXL could not win its infringement case unless Amazon's "1-
Click" feature was sufficiently equivalent to IPXL's claimed system and
Amazon used its feature in the same way as claimed by IPXL in claim 25
of its '055 patent. The court instead neglected to even consider the all-
elements rule, leaving the reader to ponder just how ambiguous the claim
really is.
Instead of relying solely on the reasoning that the claim was invalid due
to being indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, the Federal Circuit should have
provided an analysis and application of 35 U.S.C. § 101 when examining
claim 25 of the '055 patent. This section of Title 35, which was not specifi-
cally cited by the court, reads: "Whoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."'46 It is well-set-
tled law that a patent must fall within one of the express statutory catego-
ries listed in this section in order to be valid.47 Additionally, courts have
interpreted the language of this section to mean that Congress drafted
this section "so as to set forth the statutory classes of invention in the
alternative only."'48 The precedent has also been set that patent claims
overlapping two of these statutory classes may be rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 101. 49 In a 2001 case, for example, this court performed an ex-
tensive analysis of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and found:
As interpreted by the courts, apparatuses (which includes "systems")
and processes (or "methods") are both classes of patent eligible sub-
ject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and may both be claimed in the
45. Canton Bio-Medical, Inc. v. Integrated Liner Tech., Inc., 216 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
46. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West 2005) (emphasis added).
47. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974); see also In re
Bonczyk, 10 F. App'x 908, 910 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("Congress has specified the types of sub-
ject matter that may be patented in § 101. Patentable subject matter must fall within one of
these statutory categories.").
48. Ex parte Lyell, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1548, 1551 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1990) (emphasis
added).
49. Id. at 1551-52; see U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 30,
§ 2173.05(p) (2006)
(Such claims may also be rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 based on the theory
that the claim is directed to neither a "process" nor a "machine," but rather
embraces or overlaps two different statutory classes of invention set forth in
35 U.S.C. 101 which is drafted so as to set forth the statutory classes of inven-
tion in the alternative only.).
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same patent. This occurs, for example, in patents that claim both an
apparatus and a method of using the apparatus. Such patents con-
tain separate sets of claims directed towards the two different classes
of invention. However, "combining two separate statutory classes of
invention in a single claim ... is not sufficiently precise to provide
competitors with an accurate determination of the 'metes and
bounds' of protection involved. ' '50
The court in this case should have followed its previous example and
analyzed claim 25 of the '055 patent in light of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Had it
done so, the court would likely have arrived at the same conclusion that
the claim was invalid, but would have been supported by more sound
reasoning.
In conclusion, for an issue of first impression, the Federal Circuit in this
case failed to impress upon anyone a clear understanding of hybrid
claims. While the court ultimately came to the right decision regarding
the hybrid claim at issue, it overlooked key patent law concepts and failed
to provide adequate guidance needed for proper hybrid claim interpreta-
tion. The invalidation of many existing hybrid claims is now a real possi-
bility because the court did not give an adequate explanation as to what
exactly it found wrong with the language of the hybrid claim. Countless
existing patents containing similar hybrid claims, including most software
patents, are now vulnerable under the Federal Circuit's opinion in this
case. Patent claim drafting and interpretation were already difficult, and
the Federal Circuit did little to help either with its opinion in this case.
50. IPXL Holdings, L.L.C. v. Amazon.corn, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 2d 513, 543 (quoting
Lyell, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1550).
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